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Abstract
Two story-telling experiments examine the process of choosing between pronouns and proper names
in speaking. Such choices are traditionally attributed to speakers striving to make referring
expressions maximally interpretable to addressees. The experiments revealed a novel effect: even
when a pronoun would not be ambiguous, the presence of another character in the discourse decreased
pronoun use and increased latencies to refer to the most prominent character in the discourse. In other
words, speakers were more likely to call Minnie Minnie than shewhen Donald was also present. Even
when the referent character appeared alone in the stimulus picture, the presence of another character
in the preceding discourse reduced pronouns. Furthermore, pronoun use varied with features
associated with the speaker’s degree of focus on the preceding discourse (e.g., narrative style and
disfluency). We attribute this effect to competition for attentional resources in the speaker’s
representation of the discourse.
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When people talk, they refer to things. They constantly make rapid decisions about whether
an expression should be explicit, like Michelle Bacheletor the first female president in Chile,
or whether it should be relatively underspecified, like she. In this paper we examine the
production processes involved in the choice between less specific expressions, like pronouns,
and more explicit expressions, like proper names.
Research on this issue has primarily focused on the aspects of discourse that constrain speakers’
choices in referring expressions, and in particular, the linguistic discourse history. The standard
approach assumes that a speaker’s task is to pick a referring expression that maximally fits the
current discourse situation, so as to make it easy for the listener to interpret. An explicit
formulation of this idea is offered by Chafe (1994), “If language is to function effectively, a
speaker is obliged to categorize a shared referent in a way that allows the listener to identify
it” (p. 97). Similarly, Gundel and colleagues (1993) state, “the form of referring expressions…
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depends on the …assumptions that a cooperative speaker can reasonably make regarding the
addressee’s knowledge and attention state in the particular context in which the expression is
used”(p. 275). Likewise, Levelt (1989) proposes that the production of referring expressions
involves calculating the accessibility of each referent in terms of the addressee’s mental state.
This view is embodied by Grice’s maxim of quantity: “Make your contribution as informative
as is required… [but not] more informative than is required” (Grice, 1975). In other words,
speakers select reference forms based on their assumptions about addressees’ mental states.
Support for this view of reference production comes from evidence that speakers tend to choose
expressions that are unambiguous with respect to the current context. For example,
experimental manipulations of the discourse context have shown that speakers use fewer third-
person pronouns when there is more than one salient entity that matches the gender of the
pronoun (e.g., Arnold, Eisenband, Brown-Schmidt, & Trueswell, 2000; Arnold, 1999; Francik,
1985; Karmiloff-Smith, 1985). So, a speaker is less likely to refer to Michelle Bachelet as
sheif another woman has also recently been discussed. This “Gender Effect” has been explained
in terms of sensitivity to the referential ambiguity of pronouns with respect to specific situations
(e.g., Givón, 1983; Karmiloff-Smith, 1985). Similarly, the referential context has been shown
to influence the use of modifiers like smalland wooden, which are chosen more often when
needed to pick out a unique entity in the context (e.g., Brown-Schmidt & Tanenhaus, 2006;
Osgood, 1971; Sedivy, 2003; Sridhar, 1988).
A second observation about reference production is that speakers tend to use less specific forms
to refer to referents that have recently been mentioned in a discourse (Ariel, 1990; Arnold,
1998; Brennan, 1995; Chafe, 1976,1994; Givón, 1983; Gundel, Hedberg, & Zacharaski,
1993; Sridhar, 1988). Likewise, speakers use pronouns more often when referring to a character
that was the grammatical subject (e.g., Arnold, Eisenband, et al., 2000; Stevenson, Crawley,
& Kleinman, 1994), or first-mentioned entity (e.g., Gernsbacher, Hargreaves, & Beeman,
1989; Gernsbacher & Hargreaves, 1988) in the preceding clause. Grammatical subjects in
English are often the first-mentioned entity in an utterance, but not always, and both positions
have been shown to impact reference resolution when unconfounded (see Kaiser & Trueswell,
in press). Other relevant features of the discourse are the thematic roles of recently mentioned
referents, parallelism of the syntactic roles of anaphors and antecedent, and information carried
by focus constructions, like clefts (e.g., Almor, 1999; Arnold, 2001; Arnold, Eisenband, et al.,
2000; Ariel, 1990; Givón, 1983; Sanford & Garrod, 1981; Stevenson, et al., 1994; see Arnold,
1998, for a review). A referent that is highly accessible in an addressee’s discourse
representation does not require as specific a referential expression as a new referent does, so
effects of discourse status can be interpreted as evidence that speakers aim to produce
expressions that are optimally interpretable.
Despite the intuitive logic of selecting referring expressions to avoid ambiguity, ambiguity
avoidance may not be a widespread characteristic of the production system. Consider the load
that filtering every single referring expression for potential ambiguity would place on the
processing mechanisms. The interpretability of each expression would need to be evaluated
with respect to the discourse context, and not just the speaker’s own knowledge, since the
speaker of course knows the intended message. Indeed, several studies have found that speakers
do not routinely design their utterances to avoid temporary syntactic ambiguities in situations
where such an ambiguity might be avoided (e.g., Arnold, Wasow, Asudeh, & Alrenga, 2004;
Ferreira & Dell, 2000; Kraljic & Brennan, 2005; Schaefer, Speer, Warren, & White, 2000).
With some exceptions (e.g., Brown-Schmidt & Tanenhaus, 2006; Horton & Gerrig, 2005),
most research on the choice between more or less explicit forms of reference has focused on
the impact of designing phrases to be pragmatically appropriate to the discourse, to the
exclusion of considering the pressures inherent to the production process itself. The Gender
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Effect is typically described as an example of ambiguity avoidance. Similarly, accessibility
effects on the use of pronouns have been attributed to concern for the listener, where pronouns
are used to signal that the referent is highly accessible or salient in the discourse (e.g., Ariel,
1990; Gundel et al., 1993). Here we consider another class of constraint on the speaker’s choice
of referring expression -- constraints that emerge from the pressures of utterance planning and
production.
Specifically, the experiments reported here explore factors that influence pronoun use when a
pronoun would be unambiguous. Two narrative production experiments demonstrate a novel
effect on reference production: speakers are more likely to use a pronoun when there is a single
character in the discourse situation than when another character is present that could not be the
referent of a gender-marked pronoun. Preliminary evidence of this effect came from a pilot
experiment. We briefly describe this pilot experiment to show that the story-telling task used
in subsequent experiments replicates the well-established effects of gender and order of
mention on the choice of referring expressions.
Pilot Experiment
We presented participants with two-panel cartoons (see Figure 1) and the first sentence in a
story such as Mickey went for a walk with Daisy in the hills one day. Every critical item
contained two cartoon characters. Characters had either different gender (Fig. 1left) or the same
gender (Fig. 1middle), and were mentioned as the grammatical subject or in an adjunct
prepositional phrase in the opening sentence of the story (see Table 1). Thirty-eight participants
from Stanford University repeated the first sentence of each story and then generated the next
sentence in the story. Continuations were based on the second panel, in which the “Main”
character (e.g., Mickey in Figure 1 left and middle) was displayed more prominently and
actively, to encourage participants to begin their response with reference to that character. The
majority of responses (84%) referred to the Main character alone in subject position before
mentioning the other character, if the other character was mentioned at all. Only these responses
were included in analyses in this experiment and the following ones. The original motivation
for this study was to investigate the contrast between same-gender and different-gender
situations using eye tracking. However, the eye movement data were uninformative, and so
will not be discussed.
We analyzed the percentage of pronouns (out of pronouns and proper names) used to refer to
the Main character. Two missing cells in the participants’ analysis were replaced with the
participants’ means. As expected, the mean percentage of pronouns was higher in the different-
gender context (48%, SE = 6%) than the same-gender context (23%, SE = 5%), which was
reliable in analyses of variance (F1(1,35) = 22.17, p< .001; F2(1,15) = 36.56, p<.001;
minF’(1,49) = 13.80, p< .001; 95% CI = ± 8%). Here and throughout the paper, the minF’is
calculated using formulas (15) and (16) in Clark (1973). This finding replicated the difference
in pronoun use in same- and different-gender contexts that has been reported elsewhere (e.g.,
Arnold, Eisenband et al., 2000; Francik, 1987; Karmiloff-Smith, 1985).
This study also replicated the well-established tendency for pronouns to be used more often to
refer to first-mentioned than second-mentioned characters. The first sixteen participants in the
pilot study saw stimuli in four critical conditions (Same-gender/1st-mentioned; Same-gender/
2nd-mentioned; Different-gender/1st-mentioned; Different-gender/2nd-mentioned). The order-
of-mention manipulation was achieved by simply swapping the order in which the two
characters were mentioned in the first sentence. Analysis of this subset of the data revealed
more pronouns for reference to the first-mentioned character: Different/first mentioned: 53%
(SE = 9%); Different/second-mentioned: 17% (SE = 7%); Same/first-mentioned: 23% (SE =
9%); Same/second-mentioned: 0%. Three missing cells in the participants’ analysis and two
missing cells in the items analysis were replaced with the participant or item mean. A separate
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ANOVA with these data showed a main effect of gender (F1(1,15) = 27.45, p<.001; F2(1,15)
= 9.27, p< .01; minF’(1,28) = 5.96, p< .05; CI= ±9%), a main effect of order-of-mention
(F1(1,15) = 16.68, p< .005; F2(1,15) = 32.79, p<.001, minF’(1,27) = 11.06, p< .005; CI=
±15%), and no interaction (F1(1,15) = 1.03; F2(1,15) = 0.33).
Although the story-telling method replicated well-established effects found with other
methods, we thought there should have been a greater use of pronouns when the main character
was the first mentioned character and grammatical subject in the preceding sentence, and the
other character had a different gender. In this condition, pronouns would be unambiguous and
their referents should be highly accessible. To see if pronoun use was uniformly low using the
story-telling method, we analyzed three of the filler items where there was only a single
character in both panels (see right side of Figure 1and Table 1 for an example). Speakers
produced pronouns at a much higher rate for these items (85%, SE = 4%) than for the critical
items in either the same or different-gender conditions.
A simple ambiguity-avoidance explanation would not predict any difference between the
single-character and different-gender contexts, because a pronoun would be unambiguous in
both cases. That is, the pronoun hein He became very tiredclearly refers to Mickey after Mickey
went for a walk with Daisy in the hills one dayand sheclearly refers to Minnieafter One day,
Minnie imagined how great it would be to have a flower garden. Yet a post-hoc comparison
between the different-gender and single-character items revealed a robust effect of context
(F1(1,35) = 55.86, p< .001; F2(1,17) = 21.49; minF’(1,27) = 15.52, p< .001; CI= ±7%).
Although using a pronoun would not cause ambiguity in the different gender condition, it
seemed plausible that the presence of an additional character in the speaker’s discourse
representation might make the main character less prominent or accessible. That is, the
presence of a second character that could potentially be referred to could make it more difficult
to focus attention on the main character. Like others, we hypothesized that the likelihood of
selecting a pronoun rather than a proper name may be a function of the level of accessibility
or activation of the referent in the discourse structure. However, in contrast to other accounts,
we conceptualized accessibility with respect to the speaker. That is, the role of accessibility in
choice of referring expression could be similar to the role of accessibility in production choices
about order of mention and syntactic structure. Factors that make one participant in an event
more accessible in a message than another make it more likely to be mentioned early in a
sentence (see, for example, Osgood, 1971;Wundt, 1900/1970). So, mentioning a referent in an
early sentence position (e.g., grammatical subject in active or passive sentences or immediately
following the verb in double object or prepositional datives) is more likely for given than new
referents (Arnold, Wasow, Losongco, & Ginstrom, 2000; Bock, 1977), more imageable than
less imageable referents (Bock & Warren, 1985), animate as opposed to inanimate referents
(Bock, Loebell, & Morey, 1992), and referents expressed with shorter rather than longer noun
phrases (e.g., Arnold, Wasow et al., 2000; Hawkins, 1994; Stallings, MacDonald, &
O’Seaghdha, 1998; Wasow, 1997). Assuming that accessibility influences pronoun use and it
is a limited resource (in effect a function of attentional resources) could then account for the
lower rate of pronouns in the presence of a second character. Although this idea was appealing,
it explained results from a post-hoc comparison of unmatched stimuli.
In the following experiments, we systematically investigated the effect of having additional
characters present in the discourse context by measuring rates of pronoun use in contexts with
either no second character or a second character of different gender. In all of the critical
conditions, the Main character could be referred to unambiguously with a pronoun. These
experiments replicated the effect of having another character in the discourse on choice of
referring expression. In addition, reference choice varied with the speaker’s ability to attend
to the prior discourse information, as measured by a) whether they used a conjunction to link
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to the previous utterance or not, b) whether they spoke fluently or disfluently, and c) whether
they adopted a past-tense narrative style. The results of these experiments highlight the role of
factors that are not directly related to the optimization of expressions for the listener and
specifically those that cannot be explained by an ambiguity avoidance strategy.
Experiment 1
A story-telling task was used to systematically investigate the novel effect of secondary
characters on speakers’ choices between pronouns and names. As in the pilot experiment,
participants viewed two-panel cartoons (Figure 2) and heard the first sentence in a story,
e.g.Mickey went for a walk (with Daisy) in the hills one day.Participants were asked to repeat
the first sentence of each story and then generate the next sentence based on the second panel.
A Main character appeared in both panels, involved in an activity worthy of narration in the
second panel. The manipulation was whether another character was present or absent. The
other character never had the same gender as the main character, so a pronoun could
unambiguously refer to one of them. In addition, the manipulated second character was pictured
as continuing what it did in the first panel or as relatively inactive in the second panel to
discourage participants from mentioning it in their story continuations; it was also smaller than
the Main character in the second panel. We examined how participants referred to the Main
character (pronoun or name), and the latency of producing this referring expression as a
function of the other character’s presence or absence.
Based on the pilot study, we predicted that participants would produce fewer pronouns to refer
to the main character when another character was present. In addition, we hypothesized that if
this effect stemmed from competition for attentional resources, participants would take longer
to generate a referring expression in the two-character condition than in the single character
one.
Method
Participants—Twenty-three students from Georgia Tech participated in exchange for money
or course credit. All reported English as their first language and their sight to be normal or
corrected-to-normal. Three additional participants were excluded because they were not native
speakers of American English.
Materials and Procedure—Participants were asked to continue stories about pictures that
were presented in two panels. All of the characters were Disney characters, to ensure that proper
names were available to our speakers and that their gender would be easily identifiable (i.e.,
females had long eyelashes and usually wore dresses and bows, whereas males wore pants).
The visual stimuli consisted of a two-panel cartoon with either one (Figure 2left) or two
characters (Figure 2middle). If there were two characters, they were displayed with equal
salience in the first panel; in the second panel, the Main character was larger and more active
than the second character. To create the single character context, the second character was
eliminated from both panels.
Story sentences were always in past tense. In the experimental sentences, the second character
was always mentioned in a “with” phrase, and each sentence ended with a phrase that referred
to neither character (e.g., Mickey went for a walk {with Daisy} in the hills one day). The verbal
stimuli for the single-character condition were created by splicing out the prepositional phrase
referring to the second character (e.g., with Daisy), and replacing the end of the prior word
with a version that contained the appropriate co-articulation. In the two-character condition
one character was always a mouse (Mickey or Minnie) and the other a duck (Donald or Daisy),
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which reduced conceptual similarity and avoided phonological similarity between the
characters’ names.
Thus, there were two conditions of interest: single-character and two-character, where the two
characters always had different genders. There was a third condition, where the secondary
character was present only in the first panel. However, a programming error occurred in this
condition, so these data will not be reported. There were 15 items in the stimulus set, which
were rotated through the three conditions in a Latin Square design, and combined with 17 filler
items in order to create three stimulus lists. Each Disney character was the Main character in
3 or 4 of the 15 experimental items on a stimulus list. The filler items varied in the number of
characters in each panel and the number of characters mentioned in the story sentence. There
were also 2 practice items that always occurred at the beginning of each list. Items in each list
were presented in a pseudo-random order, which was then reversed to create 3 more lists.
Participants were told that they would hear the beginning of a story and pictures illustrating it.
They were instructed to repeat the story sentence and add a sentence based on the second
illustration, imagining that they were making up the story for a five-year-old child. The
experimenter went through an example story with panels printed on paper. To ensure that the
characters names were fresh in the participants’ minds, the experimenter showed participants
a sheet with five characters and their printed names (Mickey, Minnie, Donald, Daisy,and
Pluto), and named each one aloud. An identical sheet without printed names was then displayed
and the participant was asked to name each character.
At the beginning of each trial, a preview of both panels of the cartoon appeared for two seconds.
Then panel 1 appeared in the top half of a 21-inch monitor and a 22 kHz WAV file of the story
sentence was played through computer speakers. Participants repeated the first sentence of the
story. After the repetition, an experimenter pressed a key to add the second panel below panel
1 and begin digital recording of sound. The experimenter ended the trial by pressing a key after
participants added another line to the story. The experimenter was present throughout the
experiment.
Speech was digitally recorded at 12 kHz via a SoundBlaster card, using a headset microphone.
Prior to the experiment, participants counted to 3 out loud to test and calibrate the digital
recording of their voices. In both experiments, we also monitored participants’ eye-movements
with a remote ISCAN eye-tracker. However, we will not discuss the details of this set-up or
the eye movement data further, because results were completely redundant with latency effects
(i.e., the later the latency, the longer the preceding gaze on the referent), or else uninterpretable.
Results
Here and throughout the paper, we report the percentage of pronouns produced, out of the total
number of pronouns and names. We excluded cases where the referring expression denoted
more than one character (e.g.,they,both of them,Daisy and Mickey), was possessive (Daisy’s
ball, her ball), or elliptical (… and got very tired). We only included items where the
participant’s response referred to the main character as the grammatical subject and preceded
any mention of the other character. We excluded items with naming errors (e.g., Mickeyfor
Minnie) or other errors. This left 191 (83%) experimental trials.
Since the pronoun data are proportional, we also analyzed the data using an arcsine
transformation (Winer, Brown, & Michels, 1991), which always produced the same patterns
of significance. As a measure of effect size, we report 95% confidence intervals for the
difference between participant means (Masson & Loftus, 2003). Inferential statistics are
reported in Table 2. For both experiments we performed analyses of variance with both
participants (F1)and items (F2)as random factors, with either pronoun use or latency to mention
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the main character as dependent variables. Context (one character or two) was the only
independent variable in Experiment 1 and was manipulated within-participants and -items.
Pronoun use—Replicating our pilot experiment, we observed a robust difference between
the two-character and single-character contexts. Participants produced an average of 46% more
pronouns in the single-character context than the two-character context, with a confidence
interval of ±12% (see Figure 3).
Latency data—The differences between the single-character and two-character contexts are
also supported by an analysis of the time that passed before the participant named the main
character, as measured from the time when the second panel appeared. Latencies were based
on a combination of outputs from two forced alignment programs (Sphinx2 and Fasttalk™),
an amplitude based Matlab routine for speech initial references, and measurements created
with an audio editor.
The mean latency to refer to the main character was shorter in the single-character context
(2387 ms) than the two-character context (2930 ms), with a 95% confidence interval of ± 348
(see Figure 3). This difference was reliable by participants, and marginal by items (see Table
2). Longer latencies in two-character than single-character contexts could result from different
proportions of pronouns and names in the single and two character contexts. However, latency
differences were similar for proper names (338 ms) and pronouns (360 ms). The paired t-tests
on latencies for producing proper names alone, for participants and items with observations in
both cells, was marginally significant (t1(12) = 2.03, p< .07; t2(14) = 2.11, p< .06), but the
analysis for pronouns did not approach significance. This pattern of means suggests that the
difference between contexts does not stem from differences in the latencies to produce names
as opposed to pronouns.
Discussion
As in the pilot experiment, we observed a greater use of pronouns in narratives that contained
only a single character than in narratives containing two characters of different genders. This
effect is similar to the Gender Effect that we replicated in the pilot experiment, in that the
presence of another character reduced pronoun use. But whereas the Gender Effect could be
the result of avoiding ambiguous referring expressions, the Two-Character Effect cannot. In
the current experiment, there was only a single character that matched the pronouns’ lexical
features in both the single-character and two-character contexts.
How, then, might the presence of another character influence the choice of a pronoun or a
name? We proposed that the presence of additional characters might influence the amount of
attention that the speaker is able to give to each character within a non-linguistic discourse
representation. We know that discourse entities differ in the degree to which they are considered
accessible, which can be modeled in terms of the attention allocated to each character. If
attention is a limited resource (e.g., Baddeley, 1986; Kahneman, 1973), then the presence of
another entity should capture some amount of attention, decreasing the available resources for
attending to other entities.1Variation in speakers’ attention to the discourse model, as occurs
with competition, can be represented as activation of discourse entities in a mental model. We
assume, following others (e.g., Ariel, 1990; Arnold, 1998; Chafe, 1976;1994; Gundel et al.,
1993; Kameyama, 1996; Levelt, 1989; Stevenson et al., 1994), that pronouns are chosen for
entities that are highly activated or accessible, other things being equal. More explicit
expressions, like proper names and definite noun phrases, are chosen for less active entities.2
1Note that this resource and attention based account differs from the idea that monitoring the felicity of a referring expression requires
extra processing time that is not available under time pressure (Horton & Keysar, 1996). Rather this competition for resources does not
involve consideration of an addressee at all.
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If speakers experience competition when preparing to refer to a character in the presence of
another character, one would expect references to begin later during different gender trials than
during single character ones. This hypothesis was supported by analyses of reference onset
times, which were measured relative to the onset of the second panel. Latencies were over 300
ms longer in the two-character condition for both pronouns and names, suggesting that the
latency results are not due to the higher rate of proper name use in the two-character context.
Although we have presented our proposal in terms of accessibility in the speaker’s mind, our
data do not speak to questions about the degree to which accessibility is jointly constructed
between speaker and addressee, or privately calculated, reflecting internal processing factors.
Discourse models must take common ground into account at some level, for example
linguistically or visually co-present information is often assumed to be in common ground
(e.g., Clark & Marshall, 1981). However, when egocentrically available information differs
from shared information, production decisions may reflect both sources of information (e.g.,
Horton & Keysar, 1996; Wardlow Lane, Groisman, & Ferreira, 1996).
What our data do show is one way in which the speaker’s discourse model is affected by
processing pressures that are internal to the production system. Under this competition view,
the Two-Character Effect emerges out of the speaker’s own attentional allocation, and not out
of any consideration of whether the expression would be interpretable for the listener. There
is no communicative value to choosing names more often when a pronoun would be
unambiguous, and the referent is highly salient, having been mentioned as the subject of the
previous clause. Instead, the reduction in pronoun use for situations with more than one
character is likely to result from competition between entities in the speaker’s mental model,
which results in a lower level of activation for each entity.
A question arises about the level of representation at which the presence of a second character
has its effect. Here we will consider two possible loci for the Two-Character Effect. One
possibility is that competition occurs at the point of evaluating the scene in the second panel.
This would suggest that speakers are sensitive to the presence of a second character when
visually analyzing and evaluating the second panel, which may take more time and effort when
there is more than one character. To the extent that the second panel guides the decision about
how to continue the story, the participant must also decide which characters will be mentioned
in the response.
A second, more interesting, possibility is that when two characters are present in the discourse,
they share the attentional resources available, and each receives less activation in the speaker’s
internal representation. As a result, speakers are less likely to use an attenuated expression like
a pronoun for referring to that character. The next experiment was conducted to distinguish
between these possibilities.
Experiment 2
In the following experiment we sought to replicate the Two-Character Effect and explored the
locus of the competition effect by manipulating whether the second character was present in
the scene that served as the basis for the participant’s response. Specifically, we added a third
condition, the two/one context, in which there were two characters of different gender in the
first panel, just as in the two-character context. But the second panel only pictured the Main
character, implying that the secondary character had left the scene. If competition occurs during
2Note however that neither pronouns nor names should be considered the “default” expression, in that each could be argued to be the
default for a particular situation. Whereas explicit terms are preferred (and necessary) to refer to inaccessible entities, pronouns are
preferred for highly accessible entities, so much so that an explicit reference to a highly accessible entity can induce processing difficulty,
as occurs with the Repeated Name Penalty in language comprehension (Gordon et al., 1993).
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the process of comprehending a scene, we would expect to see the Two-Character effect vary
with the number of characters that are visible in the second panel. That is, we would predict
the two/one context to elicit as many pronouns as the single-character context. On the other
hand, if competition occurs during the process of representing the discourse situation, it should
occur even when the Main character appears in the second panel alone. This account predicts
that the two/one context should elicit significantly fewer pronouns than the single-character
contexts, perhaps as few as the two-character context.
Method
Participants—Twenty-three Georgia Tech students participated, having met the same
criteria as in Experiment 1. Data from an additional eight participants were not analyzed due
to technical problems, for example when difficulty calibrating the eyetracker led to cessation
of the experiment.
Materials and procedure—The same materials were used as in Experiment 1, with the
following modifications. A two/one context was created for every experimental item by
combining the first panel and sentence from the two-character condition with the second panel
from the single-character condition. The experimental stimuli were combined with six fillers
that varied the number of characters shown in first and second panels.
Experiment 2 also employed a new design that allowed us to collect three times as much data
from each participant. We presented the stimuli in three blocks, where each block contained
all experimental and filler items. The experimental items were rotated through the three
conditions, such that each block contained an equal number in each condition. Across
participants, each item was presented an equal number of times in each condition during the
first block. Thus, an analysis of the first block would be comparable to the analyses of the
previous experiments, but the entire dataset yielded more observations, and the ability to
compare each participant with his or her own data in the other conditions. The ANOVAs for
Experiment 2 included Block as well as Context as a within-participants and -items factor.
Results
Pronoun use—We used the same coding and analysis procedure as before. Means and 95%
confidence intervals around the differences between means are presented in Figure 4. Again,
we found a higher mean use of pronouns for the single-character context (67%) than the two-
character context (29%), supporting the idea that the presence of a second character competes
for attention and reduces the rate of pronoun usage for the main character. The novel condition
here was the two/one context, where the second character was present only in the first panel
and introductory sentence, and not the second panel. Here we observed a low level of pronoun
use (33%), similar to that in the two-character context. The main effect of context was robust,
even when only considering the first block (see Table 2). So, the single-character context
differed from both other contexts, but the two-character and two/one conditions did not differ
significantly. The main effect of Block and the interaction between Block and Context did not
approach significance.
Latency—Collapsing across reference forms, latencies to refer to the main character differed
between contexts. References began earlier in the single-character context (1499 ms ±117)
than in the two-character (1678) and two/one (1661) contexts (see Figure 4). Latencies
decreased with repeated presentations of the stimuli. In an ANOVA with Context and Block
and the independent variables, both main effects were significant and did not interact (see Table
2). The latencies to produce names and pronouns for the first block were analyzed separately
with ANOVAs in which Context was the only within-participants and -items factor. Block was
not included as a factor, because it resulted in a high number of missing cells in the analysis
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of pronoun and name responses separately. Even so, only 11/23 participants and 14/15 items
contributed data to the analysis with names, and 9/23 participants and 9/15 items contributed
to the analysis with pronouns. None of the Context differences reached significance in these
analyses.
Discussion
Again participants were more likely to use pronouns when there was a single character in the
discourse, compared with discourses with two characters. Pronoun use was lower and
equivalent for both the two-character context and the two/one context. In the two-character
context both characters were present in both panels, and in the two/one context both were
present in the visual and linguistic discourse context, but not in the panel that directly guided
the participants’ response. Put another way, the second panels (the proximal stimuli) for the
two/one and single-character contexts were identical, but participants produced significantly
more pronouns for the single-character context. One mechanism that could produce this
difference is competition between entities in the discourse representation.
Latency data were also consistent with the hypothesis that characters competed with each other
for resources in discourse representations. The latency to name the main character was longer
in the two-character context than in the single-character context. The results for the two/one
context eliminated one potential competing explanation for this difference. If the latency to
begin speaking was due to the visual complexity of the second panel, we should have seen a
difference between the two/one and two-character contexts, but they were equivalent and
longer than in the single-character context. These results suggest that the presence of a second
character influences the processes by which speakers choose referring expressions via the
representation of the discourse rather than the evaluation of the second panel. Similarly, the
effect is unlikely to be the result of needing to make a choice about who to refer to in their
continuation. Although participants occasionally mentioned the second character in the two/
one context (e.g., Daisy was excited when Mickey left to go get refreshments), it was far less
(19%) than in the two-character context (44%).3
Another explanation that can be excluded is the possibility that the effect of a second character
could arise during grammatical encoding rather than in forming a message from the discourse
representation. Whenever there are two entities in an event, the speaker has a choice about
which entity to mention first, which constrains the choice of syntactic construction. For
example, the information expressed in the response Mickey dumped Daisy and went off with
the boatcould have been produced as Daisy got dumped by Mickey, who went off with the
boat. Research suggests that speakers begin with information that is more accessible
conceptually or lexically (e.g. Arnold, Wasow, et al., 2000; Bock, 1982; 1986; Bock & Irwin,
1980; Ferreira & Dell, 2000; Ferreira, 2003). But even a less accessible character may compete
for that first-mentioned position, which could add processing difficulty and decrease the
activation on the speaker’s representation of each character. If so, a second character should
only reduce pronoun use when it is mentioned, and therefore present in the message. However,
the reduction in pronouns for two-character contexts occurred even when the second character
was not mentioned. In Experiment 1, pronoun use was 26% when the other character was
mentioned in the story continuation, and 18% when it was not (vs. 64% in the single-character
condition). In Experiment 2, participants used pronouns 31% when the other character was
mentioned, and 32% when it was not (vs. 67% in the single-character condition). Instead,
competition is more likely to have an effect in the discourse representation itself.
3A small portion of the single-character context sentences also had reference to another, absent Disney character, e.g. Donald went
swimming without Daisy.
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If reference production is indeed conditioned by the speaker’s own attentional resources, we
might also expect to see lower rates of pronoun use in other contexts that diminish the attention
speakers can allocate to each character. To test these hypotheses, we explored whether pronoun
use was correlated with three additional factors in Experiment 2: 1) whether the response
continues the previous sentence or not, 2) whether the participant was disfluent at the onset of
the response, and 3) when the participant chose to not to respond with the past tense (see Table
3).
We examined the effect of each of these variables in analyses of variance that collapsed across
block (and context, in the case of the disfluency and continuation analyses) to reduce the
number of cells with missing data. This was necessary because many participants produced
data of only one type, e.g. mostly fluent data. Even so, some participants or items had to be
dropped from the analyses because they did not have data in one of the response groups being
studied; these numbers are noted in Table 3. The same basic patterns of continuation and
disfluency were also observed in Experiment 1, but due to the lower number of productions
per speaker, some of the analyses did not reach significance.
Continuation—Participants had considerable leeway in their decisions about what to say in
their narratives. The instructions merely asked them to add another line to the story, making it
coherent with the first line. As a result, speakers sometimes chose to add an utterance that was
a completely new sentence, and sometimes chose to continue the original stimulus sentence.
For example, after Daisy went for a boat ride with Mickey one sunny afternoon, one participant
continued the sentence with but she fell out of the boat and Mickey didn’t realize it, and another
started a new sentence: Then Daisy fell out.
A break in speech, as occurs when a new sentence is started, is symptomatic of a shift in
attention. Many processes tend to happen at or immediately before clause or sentence breaks,
in particular message planning (Clark & Wasow, 1998; Ford, 1982; Ford & Holmes 1978).
Attending to broader aspects of the situation may decrease the activation of the main character
in their discourse representation, leading to fewer pronouns. Indeed, it has been reported that
pronoun use is lower after a thematic (Vonk, Hustinx & Simons, 1992) or temporal shift in the
discourse (McCoy & Strube, 1999).
To test whether our participants were also less likely to use pronouns after sentence breaks,
we conducted ANOVAs on the percentage of pronouns used with Continuation as a within-
participants and -items factor. An examination of our data reveals that participants did indeed
use more pronouns when the response was a continuation of the stimulus sentence, defined as
clauses beginning with and, but, so, and subordinate clauses beginning with whileor when.
Participants produced pronouns more often when they continued the prior sentence (80%) than
when they did not (58%), with a 95% confidence interval of ±12% around the difference. This
effect is not the result of the rates of continuations across conditions, which were similar
(Single-character: 25%; Two-character: 20%; Two/One: 23%). Inferential statistics for this
and the following analyses are shown in Table 3.
This result is consistent with the idea that speakers choose pronouns when the referent is
activated in their own mental model of the discourse, where this activation stems from a variety
of sources. It is not uniquely consistent with this view, however. Sentence breaks may also
lead addressees to disengage attention from the preceding discourse, and thus could lead
speakers to consider pronouns to be less interpretable, and therefore less felicitous.
Disfluency—Disfluency offers stronger evidence that speakers choose pronouns on the basis
of their own mental models, rather than considering what would be interpretable to the listener.
All speakers are disfluent some of the time; one count estimates that 6 words out of 100 are
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disfluent (Fox Tree, 1995), although this number can vary widely by individual, speech
situation, and depending on the definition of disfluency (see e.g., Shriberg, 1994). Disfluency
may occur for many reasons, but in general it is an indication that the speaker needs to delay
speaking for a moment, either because they are distracted or need an extra moment to prepare
the current utterance (Goldman-Eisler, 1968; Brown-Schmidt & Tanenhaus, 2006; Clark &
Fox Tree, 2002; Clark & Wasow, 1998). As such, disfluency indicates when the speaker is
having some increase in processing difficulty, for whatever reason.
Assuming that attention is a limited resource, then any increase in attention to formulation
should decrease the attention available for the discourse representation, thus decreasing the
activation of each character. If so, we would expect speakers to use more explicit referring
expressions, like names, when they are disfluent. Importantly, speakers do not produce
disfluency as a signal of how accessible a referent is, but rather as a result of other pressures
on the production system. Therefore, any effect of disfluency on pronoun use can be best
attributed to changes in the speaker’s own discourse representation and the activation of the
characters within it.
The referring expression of interest usually occurred clause initially, which is also where much
utterance planning tends to take place (Clark & Wasow, 1998; Clark & Fox Tree, 2002; Ford,
1982; Ford & Holmes, 1978). We categorized participants’ responses as initially disfluent if a
disfluent element occurred immediately before, during or immediately after the first word (e.g.,
Mick- Mickey …; Uh Mickey … ; Mickey uh… ). Disfluent elements included repeats, repairs,
pauses, fillers like uhor um, and elongations. If a disfluent element occurred later, the trial was
considered initially fluent. Analyses collapsed over Block and Context, using only Initial
Disfluency as a within-participants and -items factor. The results revealed a higher likelihood
of producing a pronoun in initially fluent responses (49%) than disfluent ones (36%), with a
95% confidence interval around the difference between the means of ±8%. This difference was
not due to differences in disfluency rates across conditions, which were similar (Single-
character = 19% disfluent, Two-character = 23%, Two/One = 20%).
Tense—The participants were instructed to continue the narrative that was begun in the
stimulus sentence, which was always in the past tense. They were not given any instructions
about what tense to use in their response, but most of the time the participants preserved the
feel of a narrative genre by continuing in the past tense, as all participants did in Experiment
1. However, five of the twenty-three participants in Experiment 2 produced a mixture of present
and past tense responses, apparently using the events in the second panel as a source for their
response without linking them to the first sentence of the story. If pronoun use is driven by the
speaker’s representation of the preceding discourse, we would predict a lower overall use of
pronouns for participants who were less tied to the preceding discourse, as indicated by their
choice to respond in the present tense on at least some items. For example, after Donald went
to a birthday party with Minnie at a friend’s house, one participant said Donald’s singing,
whereas another (who consistently used past tense) said He sang happy birthday.
Confirmation of our prediction comes from a comparison of the five participants who
sometimes used present tense with the other eighteen. Analyses collapsed over Block. Context
was a within-subject and -items factor, and Tense Usage was included as a between-participants
and within-items factor. There was a main effect of tense, where participants who consistently
used the past tense had a greater overall use of pronouns (53%) than the five who used mixed
past and present tense (5%), with a 95% confidence interval of 6% around the difference
between the means. There was also a main effect of context, as before, and an interaction
between context and tense. The interaction is likely the result of a floor effect, where the
difference between contexts is necessarily smaller for those participants who produced
responses in both present and past tense.
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Two experiments demonstrated a novel effect on speakers’ decisions to use more-specified or
less-specified forms of reference. Speakers produced pronouns more often when there was no
other character present in the discourse context than when there was another character of a
different gender. That is, they were over 30% more likely to refer to Mickey Mouse as
Mickeyrather than hewhen Daisy Duck was also in the discourse. This occurred even though
the referent was always the most accessible entity in the discourse, as the subject of the previous
clause tends to be (Arnold, 1998; Brennan et al., 1987, Gordon et al., 1993). Previous research
has emphasized a desire for the referring expression to be pragmatically felicitous and
interpretable to a listener (e.g., Chafe, 1994; Givón, 1980). On this view, a pronoun should not
be infelicitous when it refers to a highly accessible entity and there is a second character in the
discourse that could not be the referent of the pronoun. This suggests that the Two-Character
Effect arises from aspects of the speakers’ processing that are unrelated to the perceived needs
of a listener.
We have explained this effect in terms of competition between two characters. This idea is
consistent with evidence from the attention literature that unattended or irrelevant stimuli are
processed (e.g., Mack & Rock, 1998) and can compete for resources (Eriksen & Eriksen,
1974; Stroop, 1935). The results of Experiment 2 further localized this effect to the presence
of two characters in the discourse rather than their visual presence in the scene being described.
Thus, even though one character may be the most accessible in the discourse at that point, it
can still vary in its degree of accessibility.
Assuming that pronoun use reflects accessibility, our finding highlights the role of cognitive
pressures on the perceived accessibility of discourse characters. Although this is not
inconsistent with any current theory about reference production, most accounts of choices in
referring expression concentrate primarily on the textual characteristics of the discourse (but
see e.g., Brown-Schmidt & Tanenhaus, 2006; Horton & Keysar, 1996). These are assumed to
be important because they guide the joint discourse model, which is assumed to be shared
information, and thus available to guide the listener’s interpretation (e.g., Chafe, 1994; Clark
& Marshall, 1981; Givón, 1993; Grosz, Weinstein, & Joshi, 1994; Grosz & Sidner, 1986). That
is, the standard account of pronoun choice emphasizes the need to design referring expressions
to be understandable by the listener.
By contrast, our results are consistent with the idea that accessibility can also be influenced by
other cognitive pressures. Our primary evidence about this point is the comparison between
two-character and single-character contexts, which suggests that two entities compete with
each other, lowering the overall activation that each one has in the speaker’s mind. Consistent
evidence also comes from other characteristics of the responses: sentence continuity, reference
latency, fluency, and tense. Latency and fluency provide particularly strong evidence for
speaker-internal processes affecting choice of referring expression. Fewer pronouns were
produced following disfluency and latencies were longer when another character was in the
discourse. Such patterns are not predicted by accounts that attribute reference choice solely to
the speaker’s desire to make the references interpretable, nor to characteristics of the linguistic
discourse history. Even though disfluency can affect reference comprehension (Arnold,
Tanenhaus, Altmann, & Fagnano, 2004; Arnold, Hudson-Kam, & Tanenhaus, 2006; Ferreira
& Bailey, 2004; Brennan & Schober, 2001; Fox Tree, 1995), it is not produced specifically as
a cue to referent accessibility.
We have argued that the Two-Character Effect represents a constraint that is speaker internal,
not driven by consideration for the listener’s needs. However, we must consider whether the
presence of a second character could also affect comprehension, and thus be yet another factor
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guiding the interpretability of the pronoun. That is, perhaps speakers realized that since a second
character competes in their own representation, it is also likely to decrease activation in the
mind the addressee, and therefore the addressee should need more information. This possibility
is logically possible, albeit unparsimonious. However, it is important to note that this
explanation is still very different from an ambiguity avoidance strategy, as has been proposed
for the Gender Effect. Ambiguity avoidance requires explicitly modeling comprehension from
the perspective of someone else (i.e., someone who does not know the intended interpretation).
By contrast, speakers need only consult their own discourse representations to identify the
accessibility of each discourse entity. While they may assume that competition in their own
representation means competition for their addressees, this is a far simpler computation than
judging the interpretation of a specific lexical item from the perspective of someone who does
not know the intended referent.
The competition effect that we report here raises a question about the mechanism underlying
the Gender Effect, where pronouns are used more often when there is only one gender-matched
entity in the context (e.g., Arnold, Eisenband et al., 2000). Replicating the Gender Effect, our
pilot experiment found a reliable difference between same-gender and different-gender
contexts. Is it possible for the Gender Effect to emerge out of competition within the speaker’s
own mental representation? While not conclusive, there are several results that suggest that
such a source is feasible. First, there are results suggesting that semantic similarity within a
message representation causes interference in production. Semantic similarity between two
objects mentioned in the same utterance increased latencies to refer to the first object
(Freedman, Martin, & Biegler, 2004). For example, speakers took 41 ms longer to begin saying
horse and giraffethan horse and toaster. Note that other studies suggest that simply viewing a
related object does not cause interference (Bloem & La Heij, 2003; Damian & Bowers,
2003), so having the second object in a discourse representation seems to be a prerequisite for
interference, if not the source of it. Second, the experiments reported here suggest that having
additional entities in a discourse representation not only delays reference but also has the more
specific effect of decreasing the use of pronouns. This competition may be particularly strong
when entities share features that are relevant for reference, such as animacy, number, and
gender in English.
It has been argued that languages constrain the features that speakers need to consider as they
plan their utterances. Thus, speakers of English need to “think gender” and “think animacy”
as they plan their referring expression (see Slobin, 1996). If these features receive particular
activation in the representation of the discourse model, we would expect to see competition
between entities that share these features, with the strength of competition reflecting the degree
of overlap. Thus, it may not be necessary to posit that speakers avoid ambiguous pronouns by
considering the needs of their listeners, since the same effects may arise out of competition
within speakers’ own discourse representations.
The data we present here do not adjudicate between the ambiguity-avoidance and competition
accounts of the Gender Effect. However, in other domains it is evident that speakers do not
routinely avoid ambiguities in situations where there are easily available mechanisms to do so.
For example, Ferreira and Dell (2000) found that the production of optional that(e.g., I know
that you can type) was not used to signal that youwas the subject of an embedded clause, but
rather was used to buy the speaker an extra moment to plan when the following words were
less available. Similarly, Arnold, Wasow, and colleagues (2004) found that speakers did not
use constituent ordering to avoid temporary syntactic ambiguities. While speakers may
occasionally use prosody to avoid global ambiguities (Snedeker & Trueswell, 2003), some
experiments have found that prosodic choices are insensitive to whether the context itself
disambiguates (e.g., Kraljic & Brennan, 2005; Schaefer, Speer, Warren, & White, 2000).
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On the other hand, there is good evidence that speakers do design referring expressions to pick
out a unique object in the discourse, at least when there are no other sources of constraint
available to make disambiguation unnecessary (e.g., Brown-Schmidt, Campana, & Tanenhaus,
2004). For example, speakers tend to use size and material adjectives in definite descriptions
more often when there is a contrasting object in the context (Sedivy, 2003). The use of
contrasting adjectives, like small, has also been linked to the time at which the speaker visually
fixates the competitor (Brown-Schmidt & Tanenhaus, 2006), supporting the conclusion that
speakers are actively disambiguating their referring expressions by seeking out potential
competitor objects. Speakers are also more likely to use an optional thatin sentences like Put
the penguin (that’s) in the cup on the starwhen there is a second penguin present (Haywood,
Pickering, & Branigan, 2005).
However, cases in which speakers show such audience design may be different from pronoun
production in a crucial way. Ferreira and colleagues (2005) demonstrated that speakers were
much more likely to avoid ambiguity when the ambiguity could be assessed at a non-linguistic
message level, without considering the linguistic expression that might be used to refer to an
object. For example, reference to a flying-mammal-bat in the presence of a wooden-object-bat
was not disambiguated nearly as often as reference to a flying-mammal-bat in the presence of
a second flying-mammal-bat. Demonstrations that speakers intentionally disambiguate their
referential expressions typically occur in situations like the former, e.g. where there are multiple
objects of the same type, varying only in size, material, or physical orientation. In these cases,
as with multiple flying-mammal-bats, the speaker can appreciate the high semantic overlap
between the objects without explicitly considering referential expressions. By contrast, an
ambiguity avoidance account of the Gender Effect would be more like what Ferreira et al. call
a linguistic ambiguity, in that it would require the speaker to consider a particular linguistic
form -- a gender-marked pronoun -- and whether it would be ambiguous in that context.
Regardless of whether the Gender Effect and the Two-Character Effect can be subsumed under
the same competitive mechanism, it is clear that the presence of multiple entities in the
discourse lowers the rate of pronominal expressions in production. This finding underscores
the need to understand the relationship between the mechanisms of language production and
the properties of the discourse that influence speakers’ mental representations.
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Appendix 1
Single- and two-character stimulus sentences (with the phrase mentioning a
secondary character in parentheses)
Daisy wanted to shoot some hoops (with Mickey) one day at the park.
Daisy traveled to the awards ceremony (with Mickey) on the company expense account.
Daisy watched the playoffs (with Mickey) from excellent seats.
Daisy went for a boat ride (with Mickey) one sunny afternoon.
Donald walked onto the stage (with Minnie) at the beginning of the talent show.
Donald went camping (with Minnie) on the shore of Lake Kalapa.
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Donald went snorkeling (with Minnie) last weekend.
Donald went to a birthday party (with Minnie) at a friend’s house.
Mickey cooked up some fun (with Daisy) on the castle grounds.
Mickey decided to go horseback riding (with Daisy) around the town of Old Cheyenne.
Mickey ventured into the forest (with Daisy) one dark scary night.
Mickey went for a walk (with Daisy) in the hills one day.
Minnie enjoyed the sunny weather (with Donald) at the local pool
Minnie spent the morning (with Donald) in the mountains.
Minnie went for a hike (with Donald) in Yosemite National Park.
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Examples of visual stimuli for the pilot experiment. Left: Two-character, different-gender
context; middle: Two-character, same-gender context; right: Single-character filler.
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Examples of visual stimuli for Experiments 1 and 2. Left: Two-character, different-gender
context; middle: Single-character context, right: Two/one context for Experiment 2.
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For Experiment 1, mean percentage of pronouns and mean latencies for references collapsing
over expression. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals around the differences between the
means, calculated from the participants’ analysis.
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For Experiment 2, mean percentage of pronouns and mean latencies for references collapsing
over expression. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals around the differences between the
means, calculated from the participants’ analysis.
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Table 1
Example sentences from the pilot experiment.
Order Gender Example Sentence
First Same Mickey went for a walk with Donald in the hills one day.
First Different Mickey went for a walk with Daisy in the hills one day.
Second Same Donald went for a walk with Mickey in the hills one day.
Second Different Daisy went for a walk with Mickey in the hills one day.
-- Single character One day, Minnie imagined how great it would be to have a flower garden.
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